roadmap built, next, later, still reading

attest is the bottom of a stack: signed statements by people and the agents acting for them. Scoring sits above it, and above that, tools that tell you how likely something is to be real. Dated reasoning behind each item is in the repository's devlog; what actually shipped is on changes.

Built

Principles the next work follows

Next, in order

  1. Mutual vouches. Detect and show when a vouch is returned; weigh it above a one-sided vouch.
  2. Agents, the rest. A track record per agent, so a reader can see how a long-serving agent has behaved; revoking every agent at once; Claude's own account becoming the first agent acting for a person.
  3. Communities. A community account with its own page in the same namespace as people, founded and administered by its members. It issues memberships that each member acknowledges, so membership is mutual. Communities can vouch and be vouched for like anyone else.
  4. Contextual vouches. A vouch can carry tags, "I trust her on #soil", so trust is scoped to a subject from the start, as Pubky's tagged relationships do.
  5. Scores, first version. Transitive flow from a root you name, a person or a community, with a capacity limit at each step and decay with distance. Edge kinds weighted: mutual vouch, vouch, community membership, Tangled vouch, follows. Scoped by tag when asked. Every score shows the paths that produced it. Shown on pages, tags and the widget as "trusted by people you trust". The closest published design is Trustgraphs' vouch scoring algorithm: flow from chosen starting accounts, decay with distance, zero for anyone unreachable, integer arithmetic so every machine gets the same answer. We would rather adopt it than invent another, so attest's scores can be recomputed by anyone, and attest's vouches, which are AT Protocol records, could be an input to a Trustgraphs network.
  6. A person-held recovery key. Today the service holds the rotation key for accounts made here. Let people add a recovery key of their own that outranks ours, so their identity survives us. KERI's pre-rotation is the model to learn from.
  7. Rate our own capture risk in public, the way OpenHaven rates everyone else's: who holds which keys, which host, which company's protocol, and what we are doing about each.
  8. Import bookmarks from a Pinboard or Delicious export, or a browser's bookmarks file.
  9. Inbound trust from people not on attest, through a backlink index such as Constellation.
  10. Propose the URL-subject shape to the shared app.certified vocabulary.

Later

A subjective score on any post, relative to you

Ask for any URL, any post, any record: how is this regarded by the people and communities I trust, and the ones they trust? The answer is a small scored graph with you, or a community you choose, at the centre, with the paths shown so you can see why. The same page viewed by two people gives two honest answers. The first version is in "Next" above; this is the fuller form, contextual and explorable.

Voting

Many votes do not need secrecy: a club choosing a date, a neighbourhood ranking street repairs, a community endorsing a proposal. Those can be done now with public signed records, one per key, with trust weighting to discount accounts nobody vouches for. We want to support several flavours: yes or no, ranked, approval, quadratic.

Secret ballots are a separate and much richer problem. A good digital election needs privacy, so nobody can see or buy your vote, and also retroactive proof, so you can later confirm your own vote was cast as you intended and counted. Those pull against each other, and the known solutions involve zero-knowledge and verifiable-shuffle cryptography we have not built. It is worth tackling eventually. Paper voting is slow and expensive enough that we vote rarely and on large bundles of questions; cheap, trustworthy digital voting would let people vote more often on smaller things, and would scale. That is a later chapter, and it will get its own research note before any code.

Place-based attestations

"If you are at this place at this time, something happens": a reward, a check-in, a proof of attendance, a witness to an event. These are usually built on blockchains. Public attestations can do much of it without a chain: a key reports where it is, and the claims are scored for plausibility. The cheapest defence against spoofing is physics. A key cannot be in Vancouver at noon and Lisbon at five past, so impossible jumps are discounted by a maximum travel speed, or by keeping a "ghost" that must walk the route. Witnesses nearby vouching for each other add more.

Claims like these invite adversarial checks, and that is healthy. If you say you were somewhere and were not, anyone with an interest, a competitor or a skeptic, can sign a statement that you were not, with whatever evidence they have. attest does not settle who is right; it records both statements, signed and public. Weighing them is a layer on top, and a hard one, because the challenger may be lying or mistaken too. Being caught in a false claim can cost standing in any score built later, which is the point of making claims in public. The service's job is only the attestations.

And the rest

Still reading

Projects readers have pointed us at, or that we found, not yet studied closely enough to say how we relate. The reading room keeps them all in one place.

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